The alternative to larger classes would be less class time. Given the response to students spending time in gardens rather than the classroom, that would not seem to be a universally accepted route to better education.

You can use that statement to fund unlimited growth in education, results aside.

The fact is that teachers in the public sector earn more than their private counterparts, the results are worse (in my area private schools are a class above public)and in the last 10 years spending on public education has almost doubled, way beyond inflation.

I ask those who say that over spending is best cured by more spending. What are your suggestions for cost controls on public education and do you see a conflict of interest when an employer (government) has the ability to take money from people to give raises to its employees who keep it in power? Seems to me that liberals don’t care one whit about budgets and they use emotional (think of the children!) blackmail.

What incentive do public school teachers have if their jobs are not based on merit? As a parent I can’t choose another school so if the one we are stuck with is bad, what then? No wonder why unions oppose charter schools.

“If you want a CEA chair who can speak his or her own mind, rather than serving as administration mouth piece, you want them outside the cabinet.”

One would think that. But there have been other long-standing equilibria, and the CEA is one. What’s been forgotten about the CEA was just how its originally chartered incentives let it speak as a relatively non-political voice prior to the 1989 downgrade. For example, in one notorious prior incident, a respected academic CEA Chairman left to even greater academic renown after pointing out that the facts about Social Security being underfunded weighed heavily against the Treasury Department’s rosy picture. An independent voice for the CEA was respected not only within successive prior U.S. administrations, but also by economists of all political persuasions, and also internationally. Japan at one point modeled one of its own government economic councils after it, striving for an independent voice.

Prior to the downgrade, the CEA regularly and competitively attracted top academic economists for every one of its 9-12 positions. The top three positions were and remain political appointments. But previously, those top three also knew that they could only attract the best academic minds to the remaining senior positions if they promised to not compromise their research, independence of thought, and ability to disagree. Senior economists at the CEA could expect to continue their academic careers afterwards. The credential of serving at the CEA has since mutated into a political stamp for those who serve there, not an academic one.

It takes a strong leader to actually want to hear an occasional independent voice among his advisers. Or, an institution such as the CEA that, once commissioned by Congress precisely to be such an independent voice, earns and then retains that respect administration after administration. Once undermined, that fragile balance of respect is difficult to reinstate.

But think Romer does have an argument unique to teachers. Unlike plumbers and cab drivers, there isn’t a real market for primary and secondary school teachers. Since its a monopsony, the government has to determine the right quantity (and price). Most Democrats thought that before the recession we had too few teachers (maybe because they are union lackeys) and the potential layoffs would make that worse; as Romer says, “the costs of decreased learning time and support for students will . . . reduce our productivity for decades to come.” She also makes the case that its easier to spend the funds fast, which is important, if they go to teachers (”such aid would be very cost-effective. There are no hiring or setup costs”).

I’m not fan of teachers unions, yet I find those arguments persuasive.

Your historical points are interesting, but isn’t your argument about cabinet status the wrong way around? Cabinet status may enhance the political prestige of the CEA chair, but would increase, rather than decrease, CEA politicization. If you want a CEA chair who can speak his or her own mind, rather than serving as administration mouth piece, you want them outside the cabinet.