Archive for the 'Economics' Category

And in This Corner….

How much would you pay to see Paul Krugman debate the irrepressible Austrian economist Bob Murphy?

Murphy isn’t the first Austrian to challenge Krugman to a debate, but I bet he’s the cleverest. He’s calling for pledged donations to help the New York City Food Bank feed the hungry — with the pledges contingent on Krugman’s accepting the challenge. The pledge total is currently around $40,000 and Murphy is hoping to hit $100,000. Then Krugman can choose between facing off against Murphy or denying $100,000 worth of food assistance to the poorest of the poor — an option that in another context, Krugman himself might be quick to label as “callous”. Or worse yet, “Republican”. Here’s where you go to pony up.

I would love to see this debate, all the moreso after watching Murphy’s two promotional videos, each so entertaining in its own way that they made me want to send him money independent of the Krugman thing. Watch, and enjoy:

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Arrow’s Theorem, Take Two

Tyler Cowen is of course one of the primary reasons to be grateful that you live in the age of the Internet. But none of us is infallible, and I believe Tyler has stumbled in his account of Arrow’s Theorem. His example:

Let’s say you had two people on a desert island, John and Tom, and John wants jazz music on the radio and Tom wants rap. Furthermore any decision procedure must be consistent, in the sense of applying the same algorithm to other decisions. In this set-up (with a further assumption), there is only dictatorship, namely the rule that either “Tom gets his way” or “John gets his way.”

Not true. A rule (or, in Arrow’s language, a social welfare function) has to prescribe a choice not just today, but every day, even as Tom’s and John’s preferences might change from one day to another. So there are in fact 16 possible rules. One is “Tom always gets his way.” Another is “John always gets his way.” Another is “Always turn the radio to jazz”, which seems pretty unreasonable since it prescribes jazz even on days when Tom and John both prefer rap. Yet another is:

  • If Tom and John agree, do whatever they agree on. If they disagree, turn the radio to jazz.

That last rule is particularly interesting because it satisfies every one of Arrow’s “reasonableness” criteria without anointing a dictator. What Arrow’s theorem says is that no non-dictatorial rule can meet all of those criteria.

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Straight Arrow

arrowTyler Cowen asks which economic ideas are hardest to popularize. Arnold Kling nominates the Arrow Impossibility Theorem. Tyler responds with an attempt to popularize it. Alex Tabarrok weighs in with another. Here’s my own attempt:

Every day, Alice, Bob and Charlie split a pizza with one topping — anchovies, mushrooms or pepperoni. Their preference orderings change from day to day — some days Alice is in the mood for mushrooms, other days the very thought of mushrooms makes her queasy. Every day, they have to call in their first, second and third choice pizza orders. (The pizza delivery place insists that you specify your second and third choices in case they run out of something.) So Alice, Bob and Charlie need a method for translating their individual preferences to a pizza order.

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The Noble Savage

savageLeonard Jimmie Savage was a pioneer in modern decision theory and a disciple of Frank Plumpton Ramsey, whose story occupies the final chapter of The Big Questions.

In 1954, Savage wrote a lovely and highly influential little book called The Foundations of Statistics, which starts with six simple axioms about human preferences — one of which says that if you prefer a dog to a cat, then you’ll prefer an 11% chance of a dog to an 11% chance of a cat (and likewise for any other percentage). From these axioms, he drew deep and surprising conclusions about human behavior. This work underlies much of modern game theory, decision theory and economics in general.

According to legend (and I have reason to suspect this legend is actually true), Professor Savage was giving a talk one day when he was interrupted by the French econometrician (and then-future Nobel Prize winner) Maurice Allais, who asked Savage if he’d be willing to answer two questions about his own preferences. Savage said sure. These were the questions:

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Ignorance, Bliss, and Rationality Re-Redux

twothinkers

Can ignorance be bliss?

There is allegedly a tradition of issuing a blank cartridge to one (randomly chosen) member of each firing squad, so that no shooter knows for certain that he contributed to a death. Let’s assume that tradition really exists and let’s assume that it exists because the shooters want it. Does that prove that shooters (at least in some instances) value ignorance?

Not necessarily. It might just mean that each shooter prefers a 5/6 chance of firing a real bullet over a 100% chance of firing a real bullet. That’s not the same thing as preferring to be ignorant.

So here’s the key experiment. Offer the shooters a choice:

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Rationality Redux

thinkerThe rationality quiz that I posted on Tuesday has drawn a lot of comments from folks who think they can reconcile inconsistent answers by appealing to risk aversion. That’s surely incorrect. To see why, let’s start with another quiz.

Question 0: Which do you like better, dogs or cats?

Economists would not presume to declare either choice an irrational one. There’s no accounting for tastes.

Now I have two more questions for you:

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How Rational Are You?

rationalThe death this week of Nobel laureate (and relativity denier!) Maurice Allais reminds me that I’ve been meaning to blog about Allais’s famous challenge to the way economists think about rational decision making.

I’m going to ask you two questions about your preferences. In neither case is there a right or a wrong answer. A perfectly rational person could answer either question either way. But I do want you to think about your answers, and to write them down before you read any further.

Question 1: Which would you rather have:

  1. A million dollars for certain
  2. A lottery ticket that gives you an 89% chance to win a million dollars, a 10% chance to win five million dollars, and a 1% chance to win nothing.

Try taking this seriously. What would you actually do if you faced this choice? Don’t bother trying to figure out the “right” answer, because there is no right answer. Some perfectly rational people choose A, and other perfectly rational people choose B.

Okay, ready for the next question?

Question 2: Which would you rather have:

  1. A lottery ticket that gives you an 11% chance at a million dollars (and an 89% chance of nothing)
  2. A lottery ticket that gives you a 10% chance at five million dollars (and a 90% chance of nothing)

Once again, this is a matter of preference. There is no right or wrong answer. But decide what your answer is and write it down before you continue.

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Women’s Wages and the Back of My Envelope

Yesterday’s breathtakingly dishonest graph from the AFL-CIO touched off some discussion in comments about whether the male/female wage differential could plausibly be driven by employer discrimination.

The usual argument to the contrary runs like this: If the differential is driven by employer discrimination (as opposed to, say, the abilities and/or preferences of the workers), then non-discriminating employers (i.e. those who care only about making a buck, regardless of who they have to hire to do it) would draw only from the relatively cheap female labor pool. It wouldn’t take many of these non-discriminating employers to drive women’s wages up to the same level as men’s. We don’t see that happening, ergo the hypothesis of employer discrimination is refuted.

The problem with that argument is that it assumes employers won’t ignore a profit opportunity, whereas in fact employers ignore profit opportunities all the time — by keeping on their incompetent nephews, taking Wednesday afternoons off to play golf, or, yes, hiring people they like having around instead of people who could do a better job.

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The Python Misinterpreter

moresexI once wrote a book called More Sex is Safer Sex”. If you’re wondering what that means, you can read the essence of the argument in Chapter 12 of The Big Questions and/or watch me explain it on video.

Python programmer Jack Trainor has posted a simulation that he believes is somehow relevant to this argument. (Comments on his post are here.) I’d thought this was too nonsensical to respond to, but more than one reader has asked for a response, so here goes: Except for the fact that his code runs, Trainor’s managed to get this argument wrong in every possible way. He’s misstated the assumptions, he’s misstated the logic, and he’s misstated the conclusions.

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The Least Painful Tax

advilSome taxes are more painful than others. It’s not as simple as “the more you pay, the more it hurts”. Consider these two taxes, for example:

  • Tax A: Shoes are taxed at $0 per pair.
  • Tax B: Shoes are taxed at $100,000 per pair.

Under Tax A, everybody pays zero. Under Tax B, nobody buys shoes and everybody still pays zero. But Tax B is more painful, because it leaves us barefoot.

That’s of course an exceptionally simple example, but the same point arises in much subtler contexts. The pain caused by a tax is measured not just by what you pay, but also by what you do to avoid paying more.

So let’s try something more interesting:

  • Tax A: A tax of 50% on all wages.
  • Tax B: A tax of 40% on all wages and interest

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Capital Gains Followup

A short followup to yesterday’s post on capital gains. This came up in the comments, and I think it’s worth highlighting:

Suppose we rewrite the tax code as follows: Every March 15, women pay 20% of their incomes and men pay nothing. Every April 15th, women pay 10% and men pay 20%.

Now someone writes a letter to the New Yorker complaining that the April tax is unfair to men, who pay twice as much as women do. I think it would be fair to dismiss this complaint as silly. Yes, it’s true that if you look at the April tax in isolation, men pay more than women. But there is no sensible reason to look at the April tax in isolation. If you look at the combined effect of the March and April taxes, women pay 30% and men pay 20%. By any sensible reckoning, women are taxed at a higher rate than men.

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Getting It Right

The New Yorker arrived today, leading off with this letter to the editor about income tax rates:

…The very rich pay at significantly lower rates, because most of their income consists not of compensation for services but of capital gains and dividends, which are capped at a fifteen per cent rate.

This is wrong, wrong, wrong, wrong, wrong, wrong, wrong, and you can’t begin to think clearly about tax policy if you don’t understand why. Even if capital gains taxes were capped at one percent, income subject to those taxes would be taxed at a higher rate than straight compensation. That’s because capital gains taxes (like all other taxes on capital income) are surtaxes, assessed over and above the tax on compensation.

It always pays to think through stylized examples. Alice and Bob each work a day and earn a dollar. Alice spends her dollar right away. Bob invests his dollar, waits for it to double, and then spends the resulting two dollars. Let’s see how the tax code affects them.

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Ruthless Efficiency

ruthlessPeople are dying so that you can read this blog. Your internet access fees could more than double the income of a $400-a-year Ghanaian laborer. People are starving to death, and there you sit, with resources enough to save them (and with reputable charities standing by to effect the transfers), padding your own already luxuriant lifestyle. That’s a choice you made. It’s a choice almost everyone in the First World makes. It might or might not be a horrific choice, but it’s one for which we easily forgive each other.

(Do you already give money to Ghanaian laborers? I applaud you and I wish others would do the same. But it doesn’t change the fact that other Ghanaian laborers are dying so you can have your Internet.)

Someday you might find yourself strolling through a desert with a bottle of water and stumble on a man dying of thirst. I bet you’ll offer him some water, and I bet you’d think much less of anyone who didn’t. But there is, as far as I can see, no important moral difference between surfing the web while Africans starve and strolling through the desert while men die in front of you.

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Efficiency: The Hard Cases

canteenBill Gates is walking through the desert carrying a bottle of water. He passes a man who is half dead of thirst. Should he offer the man a drink? Should the law require him to?

We’ve been talking about economic efficiency and why it’s a good thing to care about. Today I want to look at this hardest of cases through the efficiency lens.

Let’s suppose Bill’s water is worth, say, $10,000 to him. He’d be willing to pay that much for it, and he wouldn’t cheerfully sell it for less. Why such a high number? It’s not because Bill enjoys his water any more than you or I do — it’s just because Bill happens to be filthy rich.

And the dying fellow? He’s willing to pay up to $100 for that water. He’d pay more if he had it, but $100 happens to be all he has in the world.

Should the law require Bill to give up his water? And regardless of the law, what’s his moral obligation?

A few observations:

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The Harvard Classics

If you happen to be attending Harvard this semester, one of your course options is Greg Mankiw’s Freshman Seminar 43j, “The Economist’s View of the World”:

This seminar probes how economic thinkers from the right and left view human behavior and the proper role of government in society. Each week, seminar participants read and discuss a brief, nontechnical, policy-oriented book by a prominent economist. Regular writing assignments are also required. Students should have some background in economics, such as an AP economics course in high school or simultaneous enrollment in Social Analysis 10.

The ten books on tap for this semester are:

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Efficiency Experts

Is it better to tax consumption or to tax income? Is it better to tax carbon or to mandate fuel efficiency? Is it better to foster global competition or to protect local industries?

Today, I will attack none of these questions. Instead, I will attack the meta-question of how to attack such questions. For economists evaluating alternative policies, the industry standard is the efficiency criterion, also known as the welfare criterion. (I’ll illustrate what that means as I go along.) But now comes Princeton Professor Uwe Reinhardt with a piece in the New York Times that questions the orthodox approach found in virtually all modern textbooks (including one in particular).

Let’s first dispense with the straw man. I’ve never heard of an economist who believes that every efficient policy is good, and I’ve heard of very few who believe that every inefficient policy is bad. It’s true that most economists do seem to believe that any good policy analysis should start by considering efficiency. That doesn’t mean it should end there.

I think economists are right to emphasize efficiency, and I think so for (at least) two reasons. First, emphasizing efficiency forces us to concentrate on the most important problems. Second, emphasizing efficiency forces us to be honest about our goals.

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LocoVore Followup: A Blast From the Past

By way of followup to yesterday’s post on locavores, I present this letter to the editor of Science, written in 1976 by Harvard economist Robert Dorfman. You can think of Earl Cook, to whom Dorfman is responding, as the Steven Budiansky of his time.

The article by Earl Cook, “Limits to exploitation of nonrenewable resources”, is extremely informative. In fact, I should like to assign it to my class except that it is marred by an egregious fallacy. Since this fallacy has been turning up repeatedly in writings about environmental and natural resource problems, I wish to call it to the attention of Science readers.

The mistake has to do with the nature of social cost. Cook, for example, writes “To society … the profit from mining (including oil and gas extraction) can be defined either as an energy surplus, as from the exploitation of fossil and nuclear fuel deposits, or as a work saving, as in the lessened expenditure of human energy and time when steel is used in place of wood … “. A number of other authors also equate social cost with the expenditure of energy.

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Loco-Vores

bugsSteven Budiansky, the self-described Liberal Curmudgeon, thinks there’s something wrong with the locavore movement, and says so in the New York Times. But he misses the point just as badly as the locavores themselves.

The locavores, in case you don’t follow this kind of thing, are an environmentalist sect who make a moral issue out of where your food is grown — preferring that which is local to that which comes from afar. For example, as Budiansky puts it, “it is sinful in New York City to buy a tomato grown in California because of the energy spent to truck it across the country”.

Ah, says Budiansky, but let’s look deeper — the alternative to that California tomato might be one grown in a lavishly heated greenhouse in the Hudson Valley, and at a higher energy cost. This leads him off on a merry chase through what he calls a series of math lessons, adding up the energy costs of growing and transporting food in different locations. The implicit recommendation seems to be that when you’re choosing a tomato, you should care about all the energy costs.

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Laffering All The Way

The Washington Post’s Ezra Klein had a great idea this week: He asked a bunch of economists and pundits to tell him where the Laffer curve bends. In other words, what is the marginal tax rate above which higher taxes lead to lower revenues? Meanwhile, coincidentally or not, Paul Krugman blogged on the very same question.

There’s a lot worth mentioning here, but let me start with one point that will be relevant below: Imposing a 20% income tax is not the same as cutting your wage by 20%. That’s because the income tax grabs not just a chunk of your current wages, but also a chunk of the future interest and dividends those wages enable you to earn. So a 20% income tax will, in general, discourage work more effectively than a 20% wage cut. This is important if you’re using data on wage cuts to predict the effects of income taxes.

That having been said, let’s see what we can learn from the responses:

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Deflation Followup

Yesterday’s post on deflation prompted a flurry of comments and emails remarking on how much economists disagree. This, I think, misses the point. Indeed, what I was trying to emphasize was that we all agree on the advantages of deflation as spelled out in Milton Friedman’s essay on The Optimum Quantity of Money. (I’ve put a quick summary of the key points here.) Therefore, the commentators who are currently worried about deflation must fall into two categories: First, there are the ignoramuses, of whom there are plenty on all sides of all issues. Second, there are those who are clearly not ignoramuses. Those in the latter camp have surely digested Friedman’s analysis, and understand the upside of deflation, but believe it is outweighed by some downside. It is frustrating to me that many of those commentators have failed to explain exactly what downside they have in mind.

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Deflating the Deflation Scare

deflationSo apparently we’re all supposed to be worried these days about the specter of deflation. I am doubly baffled by this—I don’t see the problem in theory and I don’t see the problem in practice. Maybe there’s something I’m missing.

Start with the theory: We learned long ago from Milton Friedman (who might have learned it from Irving Fisher) that a little bit of deflation is a good thing. That’s because deflation encourages people to hold money, and people who hold money aren’t buying stuff, and when other people don’t buy stuff, there’s more stuff left over for you and me.

There are a couple of other ways to see this, though they all come down to the same thing. Here’s the first: falling prices are good for buyers and bad for sellers, but that all washes out. It washes out in the aggregate because each gain to a buyer is offset by an equal and opposite loss to a seller. And it more or less washes out for each individual, because each of us sells roughly as much as we buy (including the sale of our labor.) But over and above all that, deflation enriches the holders of money, because their money increases in value as it sits around. That part is pretty much (may Milton’s ghost forgive me for putting it this way) a free lunch.

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Pop Answers

Yesterday’s pop quiz posed this question:

Suppose that an acre of land in Iowa can yield either 50 bushels of wheat or 100 bushels of corn, while an acre of land in Oklahoma can yield either 20 bushels of wheat or 30 bushels of corn.

Which state has the comparative advantage in growing wheat? Which state has the comparative advantage in growing corn?

Suppose the residents of each state consume 200 bushels of wheat and 360 bushels of corn. If, instead of pursuing policies of self-sufficiency, each state specializes in its area of comparative advantage, how many acres of Iowa and Oklahoma farmland are freed up for other uses?

Quite a few people got this right in comments. In Iowa, the opportunity cost of a bushel of wheat is 2 bushels of corn. In Oklahoma, the opportunity cost of a bushel of wheat is 3/2 bushels of corn. Becauses 3/2 is less than 2, Oklahoma is the low-cost wheat producer, which is the same thing as saying that Oklahoma has the comparative advantage in wheat.

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Pop Quiz

Commenting on this essay by former Intel chief Andy Grove, Tyler Cowen writes that “Only he who first shows he understands comparative advantage has license to partially reject it.”

Hear hear. When someone says “I understand comparative advantage, but in this case it doesn’t apply”, or “I understand comparative advantage but in this case it is overridden by other considerations”, my experience tells me that you can be nearly sure you’re talking to someone who does not in fact understand comparative advantage.

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Ultimately Simple

Stop me if you’ve heard this one. A subject (called the proposer) is placed in an isolation booth and given ten dollars to divide between himself and the stranger in the booth next door. The stranger (called the responder) can accept or reject the division. If he accepts, they each take their shares and go home. If he rejects, they each go home with nothing.

In experimental plays of this ultimatum game, responders tend to reject splits that are substantially worse than 50-50. This is offered as some kind of reproof to the principles of economics. After all, the responder is turning down free money.

But so what? Continue reading ‘Ultimately Simple’

A Pencil in the Eye

Okay, if Paul Krugman is going to keep on writing the same column twice a week every week forever, then I am going to keeping on objecting to it forever, though not, I promise, twice every week.

A couple of bullet points from his latest:

  • In response to the priorities of Senator John Kyl, Krugman writes: “So $30 billion in aid to the unemployed is unaffordable, but 20 times that much in tax cuts for the rich doesn’t count.” Oh, for goodness’s sake. $30 billion in aid to the unemployed might or might not be good policy and 20 times that much in tax cuts might or might not be good policy; that’s beside the point here. The point is that these are quite entirely separate issues and one’s position on the first need not dictate one’s position on the second. Aid to the unemployed is costly. Tax cuts are not. Didn’t I just say this?
  • Continue reading ‘A Pencil in the Eye’

You Can’t Keep a Good Straw Man Down

The artwork above is courtesy of Jodi Beggs, proprietress of the lively Economists Do It With Models site, who graced us with a visit in yesterday’s comments and expanded on those comments on her own page. (That’s me kicking Paul Krugman in the gut.)

Jodi objects to the tone, and in part to the substance, of my response to Paul’s recent attacks on the “deficit hawks” who oppose various spending programs that Paul happens to favor. I’d summarized his rhetorical technique as follows:

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There He Goes Again

krugmanPaul Krugman sinks to a new low with this passage:

In America, many self-described deficit hawks are hypocrites, pure and simple. They’re eager to slash benefits for those in need but their concerns about red ink vanish when it comes to tax breaks for the wealthy. Thus, Senator Ben Nelson, who sanctimoniously declared that we can’t afford $77 billion in aid to the unemployed, was instrumental in passing the first Bush tax cut, which cost a cool $1.3 trillion.

Where to begin?

First, no economist—let me repeat that—NO economist, not even Paul Krugman on the days when he’s being an economist—would count a tax cut as a cost for purposes of policy analysis. A cost is something that consumes resources, not something that changes the ownership of resources. My Principles of Economics students all understand this; so, presumably, does the Nobel-prize winning author of a prominent Principles textbook. (A possible exception: You could call a present-day tax cut costly if it necessitates a future tax increase which, for some reason, is costlier to collect than the present-day tax. I guarantee you this is not what Krugman has in mind. If it were,the $1.3 trillion number that he highlights would be totally irrelevant to the actual cost.)

Next, unemployment benefits are costly, both insofar as they discourage recipients from seeking work and insofar as they necessitate taxes that discourage productive activity. The cost of $77 billion worth of benefits is not $77 billion, but it’s not zero either.

So unemployment benefits are costly and tax cuts are not. Which doesn’t mean that all unemployment benefits are bad or that all tax cuts are good, but it’s plenty adequate to absolve the hypocrisy charge.

But Krugman, as is his wont lately, appears committed to the following flat-out dishonest rhetorical agenda:

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What Even Google Can’t Tell You

How far is it from Seattle to Vancouver? About 142 miles, according to Google maps. But a classic paper from about 15 years ago estimates the distance as 75,000 “economic miles”, meaning that the cost of transporting goods across the border is equivalent to the cost of adding an extra 75,000 miles to the trip. A subsequent paper estimates the economic distance from the United States to Japan as roughly 7 light years, raising the question of why we trade with Japan when it would be so much cheaper to trade with Alpha Centauri, a mere 4 light years down the road.

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Environmental Economics

oilspillWhen big companies (like, say, British Petroleum) wreak great havoc (like, say, by spilling millions of gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico), it can be good policy to make them compensate their victims (like, say, with a $20 billion claim fund). It can also be bad policy.

A.C. Pigou taught us that we get better outcomes when decisionmakers bear the costs of their actions. Ronald Coase taught us that Pigou’s lesson cuts two ways. The shrimp boats that are sitting idle today are sitting idle partly because BP decided to drill in the gulf, but also partly because the shrimpers chose to operate in the vicinity of an oil rig. In this case, making BP feel the costs of its own decisions entails insulating the shrimpers from the costs of theirs.

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Bad Logic — Or Bad Arithmetic?

In a blog post on what he calls the “Bad Logic of Fiscal Austerity”, Paul Krugman lays the following calculation before the public:krugman

Let me start with the budget arithmetic, borrowing an approach from Brad DeLong. Consider the long-run budget implications for the United States of spending $1 trillion on stimulus at a time when the economy is suffering from severe unemployment.

That sounds like a lot of money. But the US Treasury can currently issue long-term inflation-protected securities at an interest rate of 1.75%. So the long-term cost of servicing an extra trillion dollars of borrowing is $17.5 billion, or around 0.13 percent of GDP.

Yes. That’s the long-term cost of borrowing an extra trillion dollars. (Actually, the cost is even lower than Krugman says it is.) But the long term cost of spending an extra trillion dollars is somewhere in the vicinity, of, oh, about a trillion dollars, or about 7.4% of GDP.

Now you might argue that if some of that spending puts unemployed resources to work, then the true cost of spending a trillion is somewhat less than a trillion, but Krugman, at least here, does not attempt to make that argument. Nor do I expect that even Paul Krugman would dare to argue that an adjustment for unemployed resources could reduce the cost of government spending by roughly 98%.

Krugman is right when he says that borrowing is cheap. But the issue isn’t borrowing; it’s spending—and spending is expensive. It appears that like the President, Krugman wants to divert your attention from spending to borrowing so he can dismiss legitimate concerns without even acknowledging them. It’s a cheap trick. Don’t let either of them get away with it.

Edited to add: In fairness to Krugman, he appears to be imagining that the trillion is never paid back, so that the cost of spending it is simply the debt service of 17.5 billion per year forever. But his column makes it sound like the cost is a single one-time payment of 17.5 billion, which is absurd.