Comments for Steven Landsburg | The Big Questions: Tackling the Problems of Philosophy with Ideas from Mathematics, Economics, and Physics

Comment on In Praise of Genocide by Benkyou Burito

Benkyou Burito — Sat, 20 Mar 2010 18:10:03 +0000

Steve, you say “I suspect that cultures are worth very little at the margin (that is, we could stand to lose any one culture without missing it very much).”

So please say explicitly what you are so definitely implying. Could you write out “I Steven Landsburg believe that we could stand to lose the entire culture and identity of the _____X________ people without missing it much.” so that we can quote you on it? (where X = some ethnic, racial, or tribal identity). From what you say I think you could just pick one at random right? Or might some racial identities be more valuable than others? Could we lose the Basque, for instance, without feeling the sting, but maybe the Tibetans or the Han Chinese being destroyed would cause more pain?

Comment on Moral Education by ryan yin

ryan yin — Sat, 20 Mar 2010 16:57:07 +0000

Just because you only care about individuals doesn’t mean you don’t have “social preferences”. What if something is good for some people and bad for other people? Are you necessarily indifferent?

If you’re giving standing to the preferences of people who are insane (in the sense of having self-contradictory preferences), then I’m guessing what you mean is, you give standing to the preferences you believe they’d have if they weren’t insane. Suppose someone has Rock-Paper-Scissors preferences — what does it mean to say you care about those preferences?

Comment on Moral Education by Neil

Neil — Sat, 20 Mar 2010 16:51:09 +0000

Quite simply, my philosophy does not require “social preferences”, just individual preferences, and even those need not be complete or transitive. I give moral standing to insane people.

Comment on Moral Education by Neil

Neil — Sat, 20 Mar 2010 16:48:09 +0000

Yes, to the extent that the contracts of the living pertain to the disposition of their property after they die. We should be able to spend our money in a way that, although it must be spent after we die, gives utility to us while we live by knowing that it will be spent thusly. Such contracts benefit the living, not the dead. Jefferson was worried about the living being able to spend money that is not theirs and indebting future generations.

Comment on Moral Education by ryan yin

ryan yin — Sat, 20 Mar 2010 16:33:02 +0000

Neil,
Can you simultaneously agree with Jefferson there and also agree that we should honor the contracts entered into and social rules established by the dead? I understood him to be saying quite the opposite.

Comment on Moral Education by ryan yin

ryan yin — Sat, 20 Mar 2010 16:25:07 +0000

Because unless preferences are complete and transitive, they can’t really “make sense” in the sort of way that, as Ben pointed out, is the main draw of consequentialist ethics. We’re basically starting with the assumption that the system that functionally defines what are good outcomes and what are bad ones is internally inconsistent or at least doesn’t really tell us the important stuff.

For instance, if you literally aren’t allowed to compare nonexistence with existence, then the answer to “is this person’s birth an externality” is “mu”. It’s neither true nor false, and cannot be answered. Among all the changes that happen when going from one scenario to the other, one big one (or at least one that seems very big) can’t really be talked about. And if you can’t talk about the relative magnitude or direction of this very big impact, why are we bothering with consequentialist ethics in the first place?

Comment on Moral Education by Neil

Neil — Sat, 20 Mar 2010 16:22:14 +0000

People who exist may certainly care, while they exist, about what happens after they die, and have the right to put into effect those living concerns with contracts available to them. But other than that, the “earth belongs in usufruct to the living”, as a very famous dead person once said.

Comment on Moral Education by Neil

Neil — Sat, 20 Mar 2010 16:09:40 +0000

I am not sure why you think social preferences (whatever they are) need be complete and transitive. It is simply a matter of standing. I do not give hypothetical beings standing.

Comment on Moral Education by ryan yin

ryan yin — Sat, 20 Mar 2010 16:08:57 +0000

As for “putting weight on the dead”, I think Robin Hanson had a good post on that. It’s pretty straightforward, so long as you accept (a) people care about what happens after they die, and (b) their expectations about what happens after they die affect what people do when they’re alive. (Actually, I think either one is probably sufficient.)

Comment on Moral Education by ryan yin

ryan yin — Sat, 20 Mar 2010 16:03:20 +0000

Neil,
Fine, but that’s what I meant. Why does your rephrasing explain why, yes, social preferences are complete and transitive (aside from when births are entirely exogenous, which is truly absurd)?