Archive for the 'Puzzles' Category

The Big Surprise

Back in the 1930’s, Kurt Godel proved two amazing facts about arithmetic: First, there are true statements in arithmetic that can’t be proven. Second, the consistency of arithmetic can’t be proven (at least not without recourse to logical methods that are on shakier ground than arithmetic itself).

Yesterday, I showed you Gregory Chaitin’s remarkably simple proof, of Godel’s first theorem. Today, I’ll show you Shira Kritchman and Ron Raz’s remarkably simple (and very recent) proof of Godel’s second theorem. If you work through this argument, you will, I think, have no trouble seeing how it was inspired by the paradox of the surprise examination.

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Berry Interesting

confiture and ingredientsToday, I’m going to give you a short, simple proof of Godel’s First Incompleteness Theorem — the one that says there are true statements in arithmetic that can’t be proven. The proof is due to Gregory Chaitin, and it is far far simpler than Godel’s original proof. A bright high-schooler can grasp it instantly. And it’s wonderfully concrete. At the end, we’ll have an infinite list of statements, all easy to understand, and none of them provable — but almost all of them true (though we won’t know which ones).

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A Tale of Three Paradoxes

This is a tale of three paradoxes and why they matter.

  • First, the ancient Liar Paradox: “This sentence is false”. If this sentence is true, it must be false. If it’s false, it must be true.
  • Next, the century-old Berry Paradox: Call a phrase “short” if it contains fewer than 13 words. The English language contains a finite number of words, and hence a finite number of short phrases. Hence there must be some natural numbers that can’t be described by any short phrase. Among these natural numbers, there must be a smallest. What is that natural number? Why, it’s the smallest natural number that can’t be described by any short phrase, of course. Except that this number is in fact described by the short phrase in boldface.
  • Finally, the more modern Paradox of the Surprise Examination (or the Unexpected Hanging), which we discussed yesterday.

The paradoxes are slippery, because they are stated in the imprecise language of English. But each of them has inspired a precise mathematical counterpart that is central to a brilliant argument in mathematical logic.

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The Surprise Exam, and More Surprises

surpriseexamIf you’re the sort of person who reads this blog, you’re likely to be familiar with the paradox of the unexpected hanging, which has been floating around since 1943 but achieved popular notoriety around 1969 through the writing of Martin Gardner. But you’re less likely to be aware that the unexpected hanging plays a central role in a wonderful new piece of serious mathematics related to algorithmic complexity, Godel’s theorems, and the gap between truth and provability.

The unexpected hanging might as well be a surprise examination, and that’s the form in which I present this paradox to my students every year: In a class that meets every weekday morning, the professor announces that there will be an exam one day next week, but that students won’t know exactly which day until the exams are handed out.

The students, of course, immediately start trying to guess the day of the exam. One student (call him Bob) observes that the quiz can’t be on Friday — because if it is, the students will know that by Thursday afternoon. After all, if Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday mornings have all passed by, only Friday remains. A Friday exam can’t be a surprise exam.

A more thoughtful student (call her Carol) observes that this means the quiz must be on one of Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday — and that if it’s on Thursday, they’ll know that by Wednesday night. After all, Friday’s ruled out, so if Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday have passed by, then only Thursday remains. That rules out a surprise exam on Thursday.

Another student (call him Ted) observes that thanks to Bob and Carol, we know the exam must be on one of the first three days of the week — which means that if it’s not on Monday or Tuesday, it must be on Wednesday. Therefore if it’s on Wednesday, they’ll know this by Tuesday night. Scratch Wednesday from the list of possibilities.

Now Ted’s girlfriend Alice points out that the exam can’t be on Tuesday either. Whereupon Bob concludes that the exam must be on Monday. But wait a minute! Carol points out that if they know the exam will be on Monday, it can’t be a surprise. Therefore no surprise exam is possible.

The students, relieved, decide not to study. But they’re awfully surprised when they show up in class the following Tuesday and the professor hands out an exam.

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Thursday Puzzle and More

Yesterday’s post on taxation generated a whole lot of comments that deserve responses; unfortunately I’m too swamped right now to respond. Worse yet, I’ll be out of town — and probably not blogging — for the next few days. Sometime next week, I’ll try to craft a new blogpost addressing much of what was said in those comments.

Meanwhile, here, courtesy of our frequent and invariably interesting commenter Mike H, is a puzzle to keep you busy while I’m gone:

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Thursday Puzzle

quartersOur frequent and reliably insightful commenter Jonathan Kariv sends along this neat puzzle:

Your enemy chooses 10 points on an infinite tabletop and gives you 10 coins of the same size (let’s say U.S. quarters). Can you always place the coins on the tabletop in such a way that all 10 points are covered, but no two coins overlap?

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Friday Solution

Re yesterday’s puzzle, you’ll find answers in the comments. (We are blessed with some very smart commenters here at The Big Questions!!)

Commenter Roger Schlafly pointed this Wikipedia article where I was surprised and delighted to see a reference to a paper co-written by my old friend Dave Rusin. I did not remember that Dave had anything to do with this problem, but in retrospect I bet I knew this at one time.

I managed to dig out some notes I jotted down on this subject many many years ago. I have not doublechecked these results, and I can’t completely vouch for the careful accuracy of my younger self, so take these for what they’re worth. But here’s what I once claimed to have proved:

The reason there is exactly one pair of nonstandard six-sided dice is that six is the product of two distinct primes. For the same reason, there is exactly one pair of nonstandard n-sided dice when n is 10, or 15, or 21, or …. For any product of three distinct primes, there are at most 40 nonstandard pairs.

I also found (in what appears to be my handwriting) this chart, which I reproduce with the same caveats:

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Thursday Puzzle

diceI love this problem, which I found on the Internet many years ago. I suppose you could find a solution by Googling, but that’s of course no fair.

A standard pair of six-sided dice induce a probability distribution on the outcomes 1 through 12: The probability of rolling a 1 is 0, of rolling a 2 is 1/36, of rolling a 3 is 1/18, etc. Is there any nonstandard pair of six-sided dice that induces exactly the same probability distribution? If so, how many such pairs are there?

(A non-standard pair of six-sided dice might have, say, the numbers 1,2,2,3,8,9 on one cube and the numbers 2,3,4,4,4,4 on the other.)

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Worst Puzzle Ever

From Air Canada’s inflight magazine:

aircanada

And since I’m sure someone will ask, here is, apparently, the only solution they could think of:

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Yesterday’s Puzzle

I didn’t think anyone would get it. I was completely stumped myself until I got help from my friends. But Neil got it.

In his words, “We have onomatopoeaic words for the sounds made by all of the animals on the right.”

Or, as I prefer to think of it, the animals on the right all have vocabularies (consisting, in most cases, of a single word) while those on the left do not.

A donkey brays, and when it brays it says hee-haw. The donkey makes it to the right of the line not by virtue of braying, but by saying hee-haw. Thus the elephant, which trumpets, but thereby merely makes a noise (as opposed to saying a word) is consigned to the left.

Lions, tigers, and jaguars all roar, but to the best of my recollection from extensive reading (mostly at about age 5), lions and tigers, when roaring, actually say the word “roar”, while a jaguar merely roars incoherently. Chickens say “cheep”. Hens say “buck-buck-buck” (the act of saying this is called “clucking”). Roosters can crow in either of two dialects: Some say “rrr-rr-rrr-rr-rrrrr” while others (who my five-year-old self considered unbecomingly pretentious) say “cock-a-doodle-doo”. Pretentious they may be, but as a scientist, I am here to record the facts, not to judge them.

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What Was I Thinking?

It was said of me in graduate school that “He’s never happy unless he’s making a list”.

My compulsion to make lists has abated over the years, but it lasted long enough that I still find occasional relics lying around.

Recently I ran across the list reproduced below, dating, apparently from my zoology phase, when I was making lists that classified animals according to various criteria. But I was completely unable to recall what criterion had governed this particular list. What rule places the giraffe on the left and the dog on the right?

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A Big Answer

Several commenters (n+1, n+2, Trevor, math_geek, EconomistsDoItWithModels, Neil, Mark R., possibly others I’ve overlooked) solved yesterday’s probability puzzle correctly, and you can learn a lot by reading their answers. Here’s my version of their argument:

Among those who are prescribed the medicine, there are five kinds of people, represented by the five non-blacked-out squares in the following chart. A, B, C, D and E are the fractions of the population of each type.

First, we are given that 60% take the medicine, which means 40% don’t take it. That is, A+B+C = 3/5 and D+E = 2/5 . That’s two equations.

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Another Probability Puzzle

medicineA man goes to the doctor, gets a prescription for a headache medicine, and dies the next day. It’s known that 60% of those who receive these prescriptions actually fill them and take the medicine. It’s also been established by investigators that if the man took the medicine, then there’s a 90% chance it killed him. What’s the probability that he took the medicine and it killed him?

The answer might depend on your auxiliary assumptions, but there is a particularly simple and natural set of auxiliary assumptions that leads to a nice clean answer. And no, that answer is not 54%. (Nor would 54% be an easy answer to defend under any reasonable assumptions I can think of.)

EDIT: I had written here For extra clarity, the phrase “the medicine killed him” should be interpreted to mean that if he hadn’t taken the medicine, he wouldn’t have died. . This seems to be confusing some readers, and I briefly posted an edit here saying to ignore it — but it actually is what I meant to say all along.

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A Whole New Brain Teaser

brainToday I have a new brain teaser for you. It’s similar in flavor to last week’s brain teaser, but it’s genuinely different, and it’s different in an instructive way. And it stands on its own; you don’t need to have followed last week’s discussion to tackle this.

Here goes: There’s a certain country where everybody wants to have a son. Therefore each couple keeps having children until they have a boy; then they stop. In expectation, what is the ratio of boys to girls?

For those who were here last week, notice that this problem is genuinely different. Last week I asked about the fraction of the population that is female. If we exclude the parents, that’s the ratio G/G+B. Today’s problem asks about the ratio B/G.

Stop here if you don’t want spoilers.

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The Extra Half Boy

Last week’s series of posts on boys, girls and population ratios drew an astonishing 850 or more comments, and they’re still coming in. There’s a lot of stuff worth reading in those comments, but the conversation — which is spread out over four threads and often involves several overlapping subconversations — has become difficult to follow. Fortunately, one of our more insightful commenters has volunteered to write a guest post summarizing what he sees as some of the most important discoveries to come out of those discussions. He has signed his guest post “Tom M”, but in the comments, he is simply “Tom”.

Without further ado:

The Extra Half Boy

A Guest Post

by

Tom M.

1. Introduction

Steve Landsburg posed a problem in this post at his blog entitled Are You Smarter than Google?. Here was the problem statement:

There’s a certain country where everybody wants to have a son. Therefore each couple keeps having children until they have a boy; then they stop. What fraction of the population is female?

Well, of course, you can’t know for sure, because, by some extraordinary coincidence, the last 100,000 families in a row might have gotten boys on the first try. But in expectation, what fraction of the population is female? In other words, if there were many such countries, what fraction would you expect to observe on average?

As we’ve worked on that problem, one of the points that came up was something called the “extra half boy.”

In this post I’m going to try to summarize what we’ve said about that critter and some related issues.

A key reference, that everybody should read, is What is the expected proportion of girls?, by ‘Thomas Bayes’.

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Another Rationality Test

spockHow rational are you? I once posted a test, based on ideas of the economist Maurice Allais, that most people seem to fail. Today’s test, based on ideas of the economist Dick Zeckhauser and the philosopher Richard Jeffrey, is one that almost everyone fails.

Suppose you’ve somehow found yourself in a game of Russian Roulette. Russian roulette is not, perhaps, the most rational of games to be playing in the first place, so let’s suppose you’ve been forced to play.

Question 1: At the moment, there are two bullets in the six-shooter pointed at your head. How much would you pay to remove both bullets and play with an empty chamber?

Question 2: At the moment, there are four bullets in the six-shooter. How much would you pay to remove one of them and play with a half-full chamber?

In case it’s hard for you to come up with specific numbers, let’s ask a simpler question:

The Big Question: Which would you pay more for — the right to remove two bullets out of two, or the right to remove one bullet out of four?

The question is to be answered on the assumption that you have no heirs you care about, so money has no value to you after you’re dead.

Almost everybody says they’d pay more in the first case than the second. Arguably, that means that in this scenario almost nobody is rational — because a rational person would give the same answer to both questions.

The reason for that is not immediately obvious. To understand it, you’ve got to think about four questions:

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Status of the Bets

rouletteAs promised, I am providing an update on the status of the various bets that got placed here last week.

The problem is this: In a certain country, each family continues having children until it has a boy, then stops. In expectation, what fraction of the population is female?

The answer is: not 1/2. A more precise answer depends on your additional assumptions — the number of families, the mortality rate, whether the parents count, whether there are grandchildren, etc. It might be possible to engineer those additional assumptions in some way that makes the answer come out to 1/2, but it would surely be impossible to argue that those ad hoc assumptions, whatever they are, are implicit in the statement of the problem.

Pretty much everyone seems to understand this now. (Here’s one more learning aid, if you’re still struggling.) What, then, are we betting about? Here is a list of all the open and closed bets:

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Slippery Lube

xkcdIt has been said of Lubos Motl that he’s hard to ignore, but it’s always worth the effort. I will, soon enough, take this advice to heart. But not quite yet. Lubos’s penchant for twisting other people’s words, just so he can have something to argue about, is well known and widely remarked. As his most recent victim (though “victim” is of course too strong a word, no actual harm having been done), I thought it would be both fun and instructive to challenge him to a bet. True to form, he continued to bluster but of course refused to back up his misrepresentations with actual cash.

Now of course Lubos will say that it is I who am twisting words, and in particular that I either “changed the question” or “changed the answer” (or both) between the original post and the offer to bet. That, however, won’t wash, since I’ve agreed, as part of the terms of the bet, to let an impartial panel of statistics professors determine the answer to the question as it was originally posed. So even if I had changed the question (which I haven’t), this would prevent me from getting away with it. (And no, I haven’t changed the answer either. If Lubos claims I have, we can put that to the stats profs also.)

I’m feeling annoyed enough to say a little more along these lines, but first I’d like to make it crystal clear that my annoyance does not extend to readers who are still puzzling this out. The problem with Lubos isn’t that he’s got it wrong; it’s that he’s not the least bit interested in getting it right. A few particulars:

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Win Landsburg’s Money!!!

winLast week I posted a little brain teaser that shows up frequently in recreational puzzle books — and reportedly in Google job interviews. The interesting thing about that puzzle is that the “official” answer is wrong. Not only that, but it’s wrong for an interesting reason.

I explained the official answer, I explained exactly where it goes wrong, and I explained how to get the right answer, citing Douglas Zare’s post here as inspiration.

The physicist Lubos Motl, however, still defends the official “50%” answer on his own blog. I am therefore offering to bet him $15,000 that I’m right (with detailed terms described below). If you agree with Lubos, this is your chance to get in on the action. I will take additional bets up to $5000 per person from all comers until such time as I decide to cut this off. You can place your bet by commenting on this post with the amount you’d care to stake. Be sure to include your email address (which does not show up in the post) so I can email you and verify that you’re for real.

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A Big Answer

I was going to wait a few days before posting the answer to yesterday’s puzzler, but we’re up well over 100 comments already, the holidays are almost upon us, and I think it’s time to settle this so you can all give your full attention to whatever festivities you’ve got coming up.

Here’s the puzzle again:

More precisely: What fraction of the population should we expect to be female? That is, in a large number of similar countries, what would be the average proportion of females?

Stop reading here if you don’t want spoilers:

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Are You Smarter Than Google?

chestnutThere’s a certain country where everybody wants to have a son. Therefore each couple keeps having children until they have a boy; then they stop. What fraction of the population is female?

Well, of course, you can’t know for sure, because, by some extraordinary coincidence, the last 100,000 families in a row might have gotten boys on the first try. But in expectation, what fraction of the population is female? In other words, if there were many such countries, what fraction would you expect to observe on average?

I first heard this problem decades ago, and so, perhaps, did you. It comes up in job interviews at places like Google. The answer they expect is simple, definitive and wrong.

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That Decision Theory Problem

Last week I posed a (perhaps imperfectly remembered) problem from Nick Kiefer’s course on Decision Theory. I’m very sorry that I haven’t found time to work out a complete solution (or even to read carefully through all the comments). Today I’ll post some hints from my notes toward a solution. Warning One: Only the math nerds will care about this post. Warning Two: This has all been double checked, but none of it’s been triple checked. It could be wrong.

The goal is to guess Nick’s secret number, which is drawn randomly from a uniform distribution on the numbers from 0 to 100. Each day, he draws a new “Number of the Day” and tells you whether it’s larger or smaller than the secret number.

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How to Decide

kieferMany years ago, when I was teaching at Cornell, my then-colleague Nick Kiefer kept me endlessly amused with the creative assignments he dreamed up for the students in his Decision Theory class. I’m reporting this from memory, so I don’t guarantee that I have it exactly right, but I think this was one of those problems:

  • On Day Zero (before classes start), Nick uses his pocket calculator to generate, at random, a secret number between 0 and 100. This number is drawn from a uniform distribution, which means (roughly) that the drawing is unbiased, so any number is as likely to come up as any other. The students’ job is to guess this number.
  • On Day One — the first day of class — Nick uses his pocket calculator to generate a Number of the Day. He doesn’t tell the students what the Number of the Day is, but he does tell them whether it’s larger or smaller than the secret number.
  • On Days Two, Three, and so forth, he does the same thing. He generates a Number of the Day and announces whether it’s bigger or smaller than the secret number.
  • You, the student, can submit your guess on the day of your choice.
  • You are then assessed two penalties. The first penalty is equal to the square of the error in your guess. So if the correct number is 3 and your guess is 5, your penalty is 22, or 4. The second penalty is equal to the natural logarithm of the day when you submit your guess. So if you submit your guess on Day 7, your penalty is the log of 7, which is 1.94591.
  • These penalties are subtracted from some some fixed number of points that you’re given to start out with (say 1000). The result, after the subtraction, is your score for the assignment. This score counts for a significant fraction of your course grade.

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Blinded Justice

blindjusticeIt’s been “reasonable doubt” week here at The Big Questions. We’ve talked about recognizing reasonable doubt when you see it, about what the standard should be, and about what the standard for determining the standard should be.

This raises the question: What is the standard? Here’s the weird part: Nobody knows. The judges won’t tell you and neither will the legislators. If you’re on a jury, you’re on your own.

Now you might say that that’s a fine thing. We want to leave it to jurors to set this standard. Under that theory, a juror has two separate questions to answer. One is “How doubtful am I?” and the other is “How much doubt counts as reasonable?”. But I don’t believe anyone actually subscribes to that theory.

Here’s why I say that: Suppose that in a murder trial, the foreman of the jury reports back to the judge that the jurors have agreed that there’s a 15% chance the defendant is guilty, and that they consider 15% to be beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore they have unanimously voted to convict. I am not a lawyer, but I will cheerfully bet you that in any such case, the judge would throw the conviction out in a hurry, on the grounds that 15% is not at all beyond reasonable.

In other words, the judge does not subscribe to the theory that it’s entirely up to the jurors to set the reasonable doubt standard. Moreover, the judge would throw out the verdict at 16% or 17% or 18% and so on up to …. what? Well, up to some number. That number is a standard that the judge is prepared to enforce. What is that number? I bet the judge won’t tell you. The question is: Why not? Why doesn’t the judge say something like “You should convict if you are at least 90% certain the defendant is guilty”?

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Reasoning About Reasonableness

Two days ago, we asked whether lawyers (or anyone else) can recognize reasonable doubt (or its absence) when they see it. Yesterday we stepped back to ask the question: What is the right standard for “reasonable doubt”? Should you convict when the probability of guilt is 70%? 80%? 90%? Of course the answer might vary with the crime and the prospective punishment. To keep this discussion concrete, I’ll focus on capital punishment for murder, and to keep it simple, I’ll pretend that no other punishment is available (so that the only choices are “acquit” and “execute”).

Today I want to take yet another step back and ask: What is the right standard for deciding the right standard? Here are two possible meta-standards:

1. Minimize the suffering of innocents.

2. Minimize suffering.

The difference is in whether we choose to care about the suffering of murderers.

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Reasonable Doubts

doubtYesterday, I posed these questions:

Here I have a couple of urns. The one on the left contains 70 red balls and 30 black. The one on the right contains 30 red and 70 black.
While you weren’t looking, I reached into one of these urns and randomly drew out a dozen balls…4 of them were red and 8 were black.

1. If you had to guess, which urn would you guess I drew from?

2. What’s your estimate of the odds that you’re right?

3. Do you think you’re right beyond a reasonable doubt?

I stole this problem from the decision theorist Howard Raiffa, with some minor changes (he used bags instead of urns, and green and white balls instead of red and black — and he drew his twelve balls with replacement, rather than all at once, which has only a tiny effect on the probability). Here, with appropriate minor wording changes, is what Raiffa had to say:

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Law School Admissions Test

Here I have a couple of urns. The one on the left contains 70 red balls and 30 black. The one on the right contains 30 red and 70 black.

While you weren’t looking, I reached into one of these urns and randomly drew out a dozen balls. As you can see, 4 of them were red and 8 were black.

Here are three questions that I think you ought to be able to answer if you want to be in the business of assessing evidence:

  1. If you had to guess, which urn would you guess I drew from?
  2. What’s your estimate of the odds that you’re right?
  3. Do you think you’re right beyond a reasonable doubt?

Further discussion to follow later in the week. (Hat tip to Howard Raiffa, who will also figure in the upcoming discussion.)

Click here to comment or read others’ comments.

Miscellany

1) I just had an extremely pleasant walk around the Beale Street area in Memphis, which strikes me, roughly, as Bourbon Street without the urine. (Also without the trash and the high general level of obnoxiousness — though also of course without the magnificent architecture, etc.) Yes, I realize it’s also a different musical genre (though in both cases it’s a sub-genre of “too loud”). But it’s astonishing to me how clean the streets are here, and how well-behaved the crowds, compared to what I’ve seen in Louisiana. If they can do that here, why can’t they do it there?

2) This weekend marks the anniversary of a world-changing event — an event that might be of particular interest to readers of The Big Questions, both the book and the blog. Who can tell me what event I have in mind? (Hint: It’s an anniversary ending in zero.) I’ll blog the answer on Monday.

3) The discussion of the Allais paradox rages on in comments on multiple posts. For the few of you who have not yet tuned this out, my latest comment is an attempt to cut through the fog and identify the locus of some commenters’ confusion, or disagreement, or both. I think it will very much help focus the discussion if the dissenters could tell us where they stand on these questions. (My answers are all “yes”.)

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The Noble Savage

savageLeonard Jimmie Savage was a pioneer in modern decision theory and a disciple of Frank Plumpton Ramsey, whose story occupies the final chapter of The Big Questions.

In 1954, Savage wrote a lovely and highly influential little book called The Foundations of Statistics, which starts with six simple axioms about human preferences — one of which says that if you prefer a dog to a cat, then you’ll prefer an 11% chance of a dog to an 11% chance of a cat (and likewise for any other percentage). From these axioms, he drew deep and surprising conclusions about human behavior. This work underlies much of modern game theory, decision theory and economics in general.

According to legend (and I have reason to suspect this legend is actually true), Professor Savage was giving a talk one day when he was interrupted by the French econometrician (and then-future Nobel Prize winner) Maurice Allais, who asked Savage if he’d be willing to answer two questions about his own preferences. Savage said sure. These were the questions:

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Ignorance, Bliss, and Rationality Re-Redux

twothinkers

Can ignorance be bliss?

There is allegedly a tradition of issuing a blank cartridge to one (randomly chosen) member of each firing squad, so that no shooter knows for certain that he contributed to a death. Let’s assume that tradition really exists and let’s assume that it exists because the shooters want it. Does that prove that shooters (at least in some instances) value ignorance?

Not necessarily. It might just mean that each shooter prefers a 5/6 chance of firing a real bullet over a 100% chance of firing a real bullet. That’s not the same thing as preferring to be ignorant.

So here’s the key experiment. Offer the shooters a choice:

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